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Abstract—There is today an increasing interest in environ-
mental monitoring for a variety of specific applications, with
great impact especially on natural resource management and
preservation, economy, and people’s life and health. Typical
uses encompass, for example, Earth observation, meteorology,
natural resource monitoring, agricultural and forest monitoring,
pollution control, natural disaster observation and prediction,
and critical infrastructure monitoring. While on one hand these
systems play an important role in our society, on the other
hand their adoption can raise a number of security and privacy
concerns, representing a possible obstacle for the development of
future environmental applications. In this paper, we analyze the
security and privacy issues characterizing both the environmental
monitoring infrastructures and the data collected and processed
by them. We also provide an overview of possible countermea-
sures for diminishing the effects of these issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental monitoring systems allow the study of phys-
ical phenomena and the design of prediction and reaction
mechanisms to dangerous situations. In its general form, a
monitoring system is composed by a certain number of sensors
designed to measure different physical quantities, one or more
processing nodes, and a communication network. The sensors
provide in output analogical signals, which are conditioned
and converted into the digital domain. The digital signals
are transmitted to the processing devices, which aggregate
the obtained data to understand the measured phenomenon.
In our society, these systems are becoming more and more
important since they have a fundamental role for detecting
new environmental issues and for providing evidences that
can help in prioritizing the environmental policies. Monitoring
systems are also useful to better understand the relationships
between environment, economical activities, and individuals’
daily life and health. There is then great interest in monitoring
the environment to associate possible effects with observed
phenomena and predict critical or dangerous situations. For
instance, today we know that there is a direct link between
the exposure to PM10 and PM2,5 and different pathologies of
vascular systems. Besides, natural disaster detection, observa-
tion and, eventually, prediction can be based on monitoring
the geographical areas of interest. Monitoring of critical in-
frastructure, such as railways, highways, gas pipelines, and
electric energy distribution networks represents another sector
in which these systems are becoming highly significant.
In the last years, environmental monitoring systems have
been subject to fundamental changes due to the rapid advance-
ments of the technology as well as the development of a global
information infrastructure, such as the Internet, allowing an
easy and rapid diffusion of the information worldwide. As
an example, the advances in spectral and spatial resolutions,
new satellite technologies, and the progress in communication
technologies have improved the level of detail of satellite Earth
observations, thus making available high resolution spatial and
spectral data. Although such technological developments have
the positive effect of expanding the application fields where
environmental data can be successfully used, there is also a
negative effect related to the increase of possible misuses of
environmental data and systems. As a matter of fact, seemingly
innocuous environmental information can lead to privacy con-
cerns. For instance, ambient environmental monitoring data
could be used to identify small geographic areas. Property
owners identified in the vicinity of a hazardous waste site or
other pollution sources could experience decreased property
values or increased insurance costs.
In this paper, we aim at providing a comprehensive analysis
of the main security and privacy issues that can arise when
collecting, processing, and sharing environmental data. After
a description of the architectures and data collected by envi-
ronmental monitoring systems (Section II), we analyze their
security and privacy issues (Section III), which involve both
the infrastructure of the environmental monitoring systems
and the data collected and disseminated, and describe possible
countermeasures for mitigating them (Section IV). The paper
represents therefore a first step towards the development of
security and privacy-aware solutions easily integrable with
environmental monitoring systems.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SYSTEMS AND DATA
Before describing the security and privacy issues that can
arise in the context of environmental monitoring systems, it is
fundamental to clarify the architectures that characterize them,
and the environmental data that can be typically collected and
possibly released to the public.
A. System architectures
According to the overall architecture of the system used for
data acquisition and measurement processing, environmental
monitoring systems can be classified as: centralized, dis-
tributed, and remote sensing systems [7]. Centralized systems
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are composed of a single processor or controller, a limited
number of sensors and a simple output presentation interface.
Data are collected by sensors and transmitted to the processing
unit that performs all data analysis and feature extractions
required by the application, and stores all relevant information
as specified by the application itself. Distributed systems are
composed of a high number of sensing nodes, which often can
be added or removed, and can exploit distributed computing
and storing abilities. Sensing nodes contain a limited number
of sensors, a processing unit, and a network communication
channel. These nodes collect data, may perform local pro-
cessing, and route data and information towards processing
nodes in the distributed structure. Some nodes have interfaces
to deliver results of their elaborations, and storage devices to
save acquired sensor data and processed information. Sensing
nodes can be either deployed in a fixed position, or mobile on
board of robots to explore the environment. Remote sensing
systems are based on signals and images acquired by sensors
installed on artificial satellites or aircrafts and are typically
used for vast geographical phenomena.
Many environmental monitoring systems have a distributed
architecture, since it allows for limiting costs and impact on
the environment (small and inexpensive sensors, shorter and
cheaper sensor connections, small low-cost processing units
for real-time operations, and possibly wireless transmission
for limited interconnection costs). Besides, self-configuration
and self-calibration capabilities can be introduced for easier
deployment. This network topology has often higher power
requirements since sensing nodes continuously transmit data.
Moreover, adjacent nodes may measure redundant or highly
correlated data. Scalability may also become difficult due to
computational and bandwidth issues.
To overcome these communication, energy, and scalability
problems, hierarchical sensor networks can be considered,
which are usually composed of three-levels: local nodes (sen-
sors), intermediate nodes (local aggregation centers), and a
central processing node. Some nodes can also coordinate a
reduced number of sensors (cluster) by performing synchro-
nization and data fusion [28] (Figure 1). Computation is dis-
tributed in the hierarchical structure to create abstract views of
the environment at different abstraction levels and to compact
the information by extracting the relevant knowledge as locally
as possible. Local processing should be performed carefully to
avoid possible erroneous interpretations of the corresponding
data at higher levels. Appropriate data aggregation techniques
must be adopted to achieve a global understanding of the
measured phenomena, while avoiding data loss and redundant
transmissions [12].
Communication is a critical aspect in sensor networks. As
in the conventional architectures, it can be wired. The use of
cables to power sensors and transmit the data can however
create difficulties that can be overcome with the adoption of
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) [5]. In these architectures,
geographical position of nodes may not be a-priori known:
GPS or GIS systems are used to trace the positions of the




Fig. 1. Hierarchical sensor network.
Sensing can be performed by using sensors for the specific
quantities to be measured, placed locally in the point in which
the measure has to be taken. However, in some environments
direct local sensing may be difficult or even impossible due to
costs or environmental/operating conditions. To overcome this
problem, for some quantities indirect measures can be taken
by observing the point of interest from some distance. Visual
Sensor Networks (VSN) are an example of this approach:
their nodes are equipped with image-capturing devices and use
image-based monitoring techniques. VSNs require however
more complex devices, a greater memory usage, a higher
bandwidth, and also nodes with more power consumption.
Hierarchical sensor network architectures, composed of het-
erogeneous nodes, can be used to reduce the costs and the
computational load [24].
Remote sensing system can capture several types of quan-
tities at a significant distance (e.g., via aircrafts or artificial
satellites). Such systems can be passive or active. In the first
case, the sensors only detect quantities naturally produced by
the object, such as the radiations of the reflected sunlight
emitted by the objects. Many passive sensors can be used
according to the chosen wavelength and signal dimension
(e.g., radiometers, multispectral and hyperspectral imaging).
On the contrary, active systems send a signal to the object to
be monitored and measure the reflected pulse (e.g., RADAR,
LIDAR, laser altimeters). Remote sensing techniques can be
merged with terrestrial sensor networks to integrate local
data with large-scale observations to enhance the observation
quality, for example by co-registration [6].
Environmental monitoring systems can be classified also
according to their geographical extension in large-scale, re-
gional, and localized systems [22]. Large-scale environmental
monitoring systems are used for observing very large areas,
spanning often over several countries or even the whole globe.
Typical large-scale systems are those used for meteorological
monitoring, and the monitoring of seismic activity and hostile
environments (e.g., [2], [3]). Regional monitoring systems
cover a more limited geographical area, at the level of a single
region of a country, or of a single city. Application examples
are represented by water or air quality, land sliding, forest
wildfires, and manufacturing plant monitoring (e.g., [20]–
[22]). Localized networks focus on a very limited area, often
using small nodes and wireless transmission techniques. Ex-
amples of this kind of network are used for the monitoring
of the quality of the water and of the groundwater in very
localized points (e.g., [1]).
Environmental monitoring systems are also characterized by
the type of functionalities performed [22]. In mono-function
systems the measured quantities are directed to provide knowl-
edge for a single application. In multiple-function systems,
data are collected (possibly in subsets of different types from
different locations) and used by different applications, even
for different global purposes.
More complex measurement systems, called heterogeneous
sensor networks [22], may be created by integrating sub-
systems of the above types, especially when applications use
systems already deployed in the environment of interest or
when quantities must be measured in an heterogeneous setting.
B. Environmental data
Different data types are used in environmental monitoring
systems, depending on the applicative context. In fact, the
used sensors can measure data related to different physical
quantities: movement, speed, acceleration, force, pressure, hu-
midity, radiation, luminosity, chemical concentration, as well
as audio, video, and so on. Usually, the acquired data consist in
monodimensional or multidimensional signals (images/frame
sequences).
The data used by large-scale environmental monitoring
systems are inherent to the physical quantities chosen to
measure a single phenomenon. In these systems, the capture
and aggregation of the data are done at a high frequency, to
perform a continuous monitoring of the phenomenon. In most
cases, the geographical positions of the measuring nodes are
fixed, known a-priori and released publicly. For instance, the
system described in [23] was composed of 192 measurement
stations with fixed and known positions, and performed a con-
tinuous monitoring of air temperature, humidity, precipitations,
solar radiations, wind speed and direction, and atmospheric
pressure. The system described in [2] was composed of
more than 150 measurement stations with fixed and known
positions, and measured data from seismographs.
In the case of regional or localized environmental monitor-
ing networks with multiple functions, nowadays nodes may not
have fixed or known a-priori positions, can be equipped with
GPS devices, use wireless transmission techniques, and be
powered using batteries. For this reason, the data transmission
frequency is often smaller than the one used in large-scale
environmental monitoring systems. For instance, the system
described in [4] performed the continuous monitoring of the
waves along the coasts of Louisiana and the Mexican gulf,
measuring the wave height, their period, the direction of
propagation, the water level, and the direction and speed of the
currents. Different kinds of nodes with wireless transmission
capabilities can be used (e.g., [21], [25], [29]).
At high level, the lifecycle of environmental data can be
divided in three macro-steps: collection, storage, and publica-
tion. Data are collected from the environment and stored at the
sensor and/or processing nodes. The format of the stored data
depends on the specific purpose for which such data have been
collected. Authorized parties can access the environmental
data for analysis or other purposes. The environmental data (or
a subset of them) can then be made publicly or semipublicly
available. The publication of the data is typically in the form of
macrodata (i.e., tables reporting aggregated information about
an environmental phenomenon) or microdata (i.e., records
reporting data related to specific physical measurements) [15].
In the remainder of this paper, we illustrate some security
and privacy risks that may arise in the different steps of their
lifecycle. To fix ideas and make the following discussion clear,
we refer our examples to a scenario charaterized by a localized
network in the city of San Francisco, which is under the
control of the local municipality. The system is distributed
and the sensor nodes are organized according to a centralized
configuration. The collected data are stored at processing node
PN . Alice is an adversary that tries to violate the monitoring
system and to discover sensitive information. We also consider
a fictitious factoryA, which improperly releases pollutants and
production rejects in the environment.
III. SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN ENVIRONMENTAL
MONITORING
Security risks are related to the threats that can undermine
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data during
any stage of their lifecycle, and of the system in its entirety
(e.g., system architecture and communication infrastructure).
Privacy risks are related to the threats that can allow an
adversary to use the environmental data for inferring sensitive
information, which is not intended for disclosure and should
be kept private. Security and privacy risks are often correlated,
and an adversary can exploit a security violation for breaching
data privacy. For instance, Alice might violate the physical
security of processing node PN (security violation) to access
private information related to the pollutant levels in the air
of San Francisco, and infer pathologies of the citizens of a
given area of the city (privacy violation). Note that in the
following discussion, we neither consider the classical security
problems related to failures of the system and/or applications
due to errors, nor the reliability and dependability aspects of
the system, as our goal is to focus on the less-known security
and privacy issues.
A. Security risks
They are related to all threats that can: i) damage the system
infrastructure; ii) violate communication channels among the
system components; iii) allow unauthorized parties to intrude
into the system for malicious purposes.
• Damages to the system infrastructure. This category
of security risks includes attacks aimed at physically
damaging the monitoring system or at violating the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the collected
data. These attacks can have an effect on each of the three
steps of the environmental data’s lifecycle. For instance,
suppose that the local municipality of San Francisco
analyzes the collected environmental data to determine
the safest location where a new children playground can
be build, and suppose that Alice maliciously damages the
sensor nodes close to factory A. Clearly, the collection of
the environmental data is compromised since this sensor
nodes is not available (data availability violation). An
analysis on the (partial) environmental data available to
the local municipality can erroneously identify an area
close to factory A as the safest area where building the
new playground. In this case children will be exposed to
pollutants and production rejects. The same risks apply
when all sensor nodes are working properly but the
processing node stops to work, since the analysis of the
environmental data is compromised as it cannot be based
on the latest measurements of the sensor nodes. Similar
problems can happen when an adversary attacks the
databases where environmental data are stored (storage
step), or the systems where they are published (publica-
tion step). In all these cases, data confidentiality, integrity,
and availability can be compromised.
• Violation of the communication channels. An adversary
may violate the communication channels in the sensor
network. In particular, the adversary might only monitor
the communication channels (passive adversary) or also
attempt to delete or modify data transmitted on such
channels (active adversary). In addition to these “clas-
sical” attacks (which can violate the confidentiality and
integrity of the data), an adversary can also monitor the
accesses performed on the data by the authorized parties,
thus discovering some sensitive information about them.
For instance, the fact that an authorized party accesses
data related to the concentration of particulates discloses
the fact that the party is interested in discovering the
polluted areas. If the party is a building constructor,
this may imply that the party is interested in building a
new apartment complex, and therefore the adversary can
speculate on the costs of the lands. Effective protection of
data access also requires the protection of access patterns:
an adversary should not be able to see whether two
accesses performed by two different parties aimed at the
same data. For instance, Alice should not be able to see
if two competitors are interested in performing similar
analysis on the environmental data. If so, Alice would be
able to sell this knowledge to one of the two competitors.
• Unauthorized access. Environmental data should be avail-
able only to the authorized parties. Clearly, access re-
strictions apply only when data are not publicly released
since in this case (publication step) data are available
to everybody without further restrictions. Unauthorized
accesses can possibly involve the sensor nodes or the
database where environmental data are stored after their
collection and analysis. In the first case, an adversary can
be interested in accessing raw data to update them or to
inject false data so that tampered data are sent to the
processing node. For instance, Alice can be interested in
manipulating the measurements performed by the sensor
nodes close to factory A to reduce the concentration
of a specific harmful substance. In the second case, an
adversary is clearly interested in accessing environmental
data after their collection, normalization, and analysis.
Such data can also be stored together with other datasets
and therefore the adversary can discover correlations and
dependencies among these different datasets. In these
cases, both data confidentiality and integrity are at risk.
B. Privacy risks
They are related to all threats that can allow an adversary
to (directly or indirectly) infer sensitive information from the
collected environmental data. These inferences can involve
individuals, the environmental area on which data have been
collected, and also areas close to or correlated with it. For
instance, the dissemination of studies on the presence of
polluting substances in geographical areas or workplaces can
be correlated with the medical history of the patients living
in that areas. As another example, the knowledge that some
geographical areas are polluted with harmful substances can
also affect individuals who live in other areas if, for instance,
they own properties in the polluted areas. In fact, the value
of such properties could decrease due to such knowledge.
Privacy risks can occur when environmental data are made
publicly available (publication step) or when they are (properly
or improperly) accessed, and can be a consequence of data cor-
relations and associations, of observations of data evolutions
and unusual data, and of the knowledge of users’ locations.
• Data correlation and association. The correlations ex-
isting among different phenomena can be successfully
exploited for inferring sensitive information. As an ex-
ample, consider a life and sickness insurance company in
San Francisco. Suppose that an external source releases
a study about the relationship between pollutants and
rare diseases. By analyzing environmental data collected
by the local municipality, and comparing them with this
study, the insurance company can decide to increase the
risk associated with citizens living in polluted areas of
San Francisco and re-compute their insurance policies.
In addition to correlation, also the association of environ-
mental data with other data coming from different sources
can be exploited for inferring sensitive information. For
instance, suppose that Alice can access a collection of
data recording the medical histories of a community of
patients. Alice might then link such data with airborne
pollution studies (by exploiting city and county zones
that are used to identify population exposed to specific
airborne pollutants), and violate patients’ privacy.
• Data evolutions. Sensor nodes can perform several mea-
surements of quantities of interest over time (e.g., a
measuring station can continuously record the noise level
in a given area of a city). While a high number of
samples allows a more meaningful analysis of a given
phenomenon, such repeated measurements can be ex-
ploited for inferring sensitive information. For instance,
suppose that Alice wants to discover the timetable of the
freight trains traversing the railroad passing in San Fran-
cisco, which is kept secret by the local train company.
Suppose also that the environmental monitoring of the
local municipality includes the measurements of the noise
pollution in the city. Having access to the measurements
collected close to the railway, Alice can notice peaks in
the noise levels and correlate this information with the
public timetables of passenger trains, thus re-constructing
the freight trains timetable.
• Unusual data. Inferences can also be drawn when the col-
lected environmental data deviate from what is expected
or is considered as normal. For instance, suppose that
the environmental monitoring of San Francisco shows a
high level of radioactivity. If the neighbor cities do not
show such a high level of radioactivity, it may highlight
the presence of a location storing radioactive material.
Otherwise, if the same level of radioactivity is observed
also in other cities, the radioactivity in San Francisco can
be due to some peculiarities of the soil.
• Users’ locations. Mobile phones (or smartphones) are
nowadays portable computers that everyone uses and
carries with her all times. In the near future, we can
imagine that our phones will be equipped with new
sensors and new applications specifically targeted to the
environmental monitoring (e.g., the PEIR project). This
implies that environmental monitoring will be directly
performed by users, who will collect data related to the
locations they visit. Such data have to be tagged with the
location in which they have been captured. An adversary
able to track the movements of a user can violate her
privacy since the adversary can discover user’s frequent
addresses (e.g., home and workplace), usual movements
(e.g., from home to work) and habits, and, accordingly,
infer sensitive information about the user. For instance,
suppose that Alice gains access to the movements of her
colleague Bob. Alice can discover that Bob visits every
day a clinic for cardiovascular diseases, meaning that
Bob, or one of his relatives or close friends, suffers form
a cardiovascular disease.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES
We now describe possible countermeasures that can be
adopted to avoid or mitigate the security and privacy risks
described in the previous section.
A. Counteracting security risks
The security risks related to the system architecture can be
prevented by the hardening of the physical security of the
whole system architecture and by adopting intrusion detection
systems [27]. Fault-tolerance solutions can also be helpful
when an adversary turns out to be successful and some parts of
the system report damages. For instance, a simple solution for
ensuring the availability of the data stored in the processing
node consists in replicating the data on several machines,
possibly located in different sites. The classical attacks on
the communication channels can indeed be prevented by
encrypting the traffic. However, this approach is not always
applicable, since data measurements can be performed by
sensor nodes with limited computational capabilities. In this
case, smarter lightweight solutions are needed (e.g., [11]).
Specific techniques have to be adopted for protecting the
access patterns in line with the techniques developed in the
database field (e.g., [18]). The idea is to change the physical
location (blocks of the hard disk) where data are stored at
each access. To prevent unauthorized access to the system, an
access control mechanism is needed. Since in the considered
scenario the identity of the users accessing the data may not
always be known in advance, traditional identity-based access
control techniques (e.g., [19]) might not be applicable. To
overcome this problem, attribute-based access control might
represent a viable solution (e.g., [9]). In this case, rather than
considering users’ identities, the authorizations stating who
can access what data are defined by taking into consideration
properties (e.g., age, nationality, occupation) of the authorized
parties. For instance, suppose that the local municipality of San
Francisco aims at giving access to the collected environmental
data only to U.S. citizens. To this aim, the access control policy
might grant access to users showing that they hold a U.S.
passport, regardless of their identity.
B. Counteracting privacy risks
To protect environmental data from inferences it is needed
to adopt techniques such that: i) the analysis that an adversary
can perform on them are limited; ii) correlations, associations,
and dependencies among data coming from different sources
are obfuscated. Intuitively, storing data in encrypted form can
represent a possible solution to guarantee the protection of
environmental data from inferences. Since however different
users can be entitled to access different portions of the data,
data encryption should be combined with access control, thus
enforcing selective encryption (e.g., [16]). With this strategy,
the key with which data are encrypted is regulated by the
authorizations holding on the data. In particular, selective
encryption ensures that each user can compute all and only
the keys of the resources that she can access. When encryption
results too heavy or when the encryption of the whole data is
an overdue, alternative solutions can be adopted. For instance,
there can exist situations in which what is sensitive is the
data association, rather than specific data values. For instance,
while the release of the list of air pollutants in the area of
San Francisco or of the list of places equipped with a sensor
might not be considered harmful, the association between the
position of a sensor and the measured pollutants concentration
can be considered sensitive. In such cases, the privacy of
sensitive information can be protected by adopting solutions
based on the vertical fragmentation of the data (e.g., [14],
[17]). The intuition here is that when the joint visibility
of some pieces of information is sensitive, such pieces of
information can be split in different portions not joinable.
For instance, suppose that the collected environmental data
include information about: i) the concentration of a pollutant
in an area; ii) the area; and iii) the owner of the properties
within the area. To protect the identities of those individuals
who own polluted properties, it is sufficient to split the data
in two fragments: one fragment includes the concentration of
the pollutant and the corresponding area (with the information
about the owners of properties possibly encrypted) and the
other fragment includes the information about the owners.
When environmental data are publicly released, the possible
countermeasures for their protection depend on the format of
the data themselves (see Section II). In case of macrodata, it
is possible to protect the data before tabulations (producing a
sanitized version of the data collection so that the information
reported in a macrodata table cannot be exploited for inferring
sensitive information), or after tabulation (finding and protect-
ing those cells that can reveal sensitive information) [15]. For
instance, consider a macrodata table reporting the concentra-
tion of a pollutant during the day and night for each county of
a given region. The cells of the microdata table that contain a
high value can be considered sensitive since they indicate that
the person living in the high polluted counties may have a high
probability of suffering from specific illnesses. The content
of these cells need therefore to be suppressed. In case of
microdata, privacy can be preserved adapting techniques that,
for example, generalize the data (e.g., k-anonymity [26]) while
however preserving data truthfulness. Goal of these techniques
is to protect either the identities, or the sensitive information
of the individuals to whom data refer. For instance, consider
the release of an environmental microdata table reporting, for
each citizen of San Francisco, the air pollutants concentration
measured by her closest sensor in the city. Publishing a k-
anonymous version of this table ensures that, broadly speaking,
the identity of each respondent can be indistinguishably related
to no less than k−1 other individuals.
Inferences exploiting observations of users’ positions and
movements can be counteracted adopting techniques devel-
oped for protecting location data. For instance, the privacy of
users can be protected by hiding the link between their identity
and their sensitive information (e.g., [10]), by degrading
the accuracy of the location measurement (e.g., [8]), or by
releasing a path shared by multiple users so to make them
indistinguishable (e.g., [13]).
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented an overview of the main security
and privacy issues in environmental monitoring systems. Our
work can help in understanding such issues and in designing
novel environmental systems and applications that guarantee
a privacy-aware collection, management, and dissemination of
environmental data.
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